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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
- : "he "-.• .j, wnether a claim for 
loss of 2. spouse s . ^ - j , scc.riy, affecti rn, and companionship, 
common 1 y > n c <*•• r consorciui. z ~ r " r .< /h i ch :; : e J I e I: ' :::a i i b e 
granted under U tah law• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Lori Cruz, claims damages for loss of 
consortium caused her when her husband, Nicho] as ? Cr \ iz 
si iffered injuries in a car accident caused by defendant's 
negligence. 
Disposition m Lower louit 
On the first day of trial in this case, prior to the 
commencement of; evidence, Judge Cullen Y, Christensen granted 
• iefei idanc. s moMun to dismiss plaint: i:;t uori Cruz's claim for 
Loss of consortium us r^o1: being cognizable under Utah law, 
(Partial Transcript, of Proceedings >' \ , i 
• Plaintiff Nicnolas :ruz*3 case against the defendant 
was ohen tried before -J jury which found zne defendant l.on% 
responsible for the .icc^ denr an J dVvaraed y -ai;i:. i it N-jncias 
Cruz $142/78 4.3 4 m damages- (See (Drier, Addendum, i rhii: 
judgment has oeen oa-d and is not aonealed cv either plain*" iff 
i .' ' lerenaant. i baa ^acisraction 3t judgment, Aadendum. ) 
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Statement of Facts 
Mrs. Cruz is, and at all times relevant hereto has 
seen, Mr. Cruz' wife. Due to her husband's injuries and his 
long convalescence period, Mrs. Cruz has also been injured in 
that she has lost services, society, advice, companionship and 
conjugal affection which her husband would have otherwise been 
able to provide. (See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As currently interpreted, Utah Code Annotated Section 
30-2-4, eliminates a husband's cause of action for loss of his 
wife's consortium. However, at common law and when Utah's 
constitution was adopted, husbands had such a cause of action. 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution, Utah's "Open 
Courts" provision, prohibits the legislature from eliminating 
causes of action that existed at the time of the adoption of 
the constitution. 
The interpretation of Section 30-2-4 as eliminating a 
husband's consortium claim is erroneous. This statute was 
passed as part of Utah's Married Women's Act and was intended 
to give married women their own legal being. It was not meant 
to eliminate a husband's action for loss of consortium. 
Once it has been recognized that Section 30-2-4 did 
not eliminate a husband's cause of action for loss of 
consortium, equal protection principles dictate that such a 
cause of action also be recognized in the wife. 
Further, Utah's allowance of damages for loss of 
consortium in wrongful death actions creates an inconsistency 
in legislative policy which should not be attributed to the 
Utah State Legislature. 
Finally, the common law in other jurisdictions now 
overwhelmingly recognizes claims for loss of consortium. This 
court has demonstrated consonance with that philosophy by 
exhibiting a high regard for injury to relational interests in 
its recent decisions. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSORTIUM LAW IN UTAH 
At common law a husband had a cause of action for loss 
of his wife's consortium. Husband's Right to Damages for Loss 
of Consortium, 21 ALR 1519, supplemented 133 ALR 1157. 
The common law was established as the law of the 
territory of Utah by Sec. 17 of The Organic Act of The 
Territory of Utah which made Utah a territory of the United 
States on September 9, 1850. People v. Green, 1 Ut 11, 13 
(1855). Sec. 17 of that act provided: 
"And be it further enacted, that the 
Constitution and laws of the United 
States are hereby extended over and 
declared to be in force in said 
Territory of Utah, so far as the same, 
or any provision thereof, may be 
applicable.'1 
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This Court affirmed that the common law was 
established as the law of the territory in the case of Hilton v. 
Thatcher, 31 Ut.360 (1906): 
"During all the time since the approval 
of what is known as the 'Organic Act 
Establishing a Territorial Government 
for Utah,' the common law has been in 
force in the territory and state of 
Utah. That the same was put in force by 
section 17 of said act, the Supreme 
Court of the territory of Utah expressly 
decided in the case of People v. Green, 
1 Utah 11. The Constitution of Utah was 
adopted by the people on November 5, 
1895, and Utah became a state by virtue 
of the proclamation of the President of 
the United States on the 4th day of 
January, 1896. By section 2 of article 
24 of the Constitution, all laws of the 
territory of Utah then in force were 
continued in force until they expired of 
their own limitation or were regularly 
repealed." 
Id. at 364-365. 
As the common law was in force as part of "all laws of 
the territory . ..," it was carried forward in force when Utah 
adopted its Constitution and became a state. 
Because the Utah territorial legislature had enacted no 
statute abrogating a husband's common-law right to recover for 
loss of his wife's consortium, the cause of action existed at 
the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution. Id. 
The Utah Constitution, adopted in 1895, contained a 
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section which is commonly known as an "Open Courts" or "Injury 
Redress" provision: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
In 1898, the second session of the Utah State 
Legislature passed Sec. 1201, now numbered Sec. 30-2-4, as part 
of Utah's Married Women's Act: 
''A wife may receive the wages for her 
personal labor, maintain an action 
therefor in her own name and hold the 
same in her own right, and may prosecute 
and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her 
rights and property as if unmarried. 
There shall be no right of recovery by 
the husband on account of personal 
injury or wrong to his wife, or for 
expenses connected therewith, but the 
wife may recover against a third person 
for such injury or wrong as if 
unmarried, and such recovery shall 
include expenses of medical treatment 
and other expenses paid or assumed by 
the husband." 
Also, in 1898, the state legislature passed Section 
68-3-1: 
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The common law of England so far as it 
is not repugant to, or in conflict with, 
the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or the Constitution or laws of 
this state, and so far only as it is 
consistent with and adapted to the 
natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people 
nereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be 
the rule of decision in all of this 
state. 
In Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Ut. 116, 121 (1915), this court 
considered the common law's history in Utah and held that, MNot 
until [the adoption of Section 68-3-1] was the common law of 
England adopted in this territory or state by any positive 
enactment." [Emphasis added.) 
On the question of whether Utah had adopted the common 
law prior to that, the court concluded: 
"... while Congress, by extending over 
the Territory of Utah the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, put in 
force, in the language of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 'the system 
of common law and equity which generally 
prevails in this country,' yet did not 
so extend or transplant the common law 
of England, with all its rigor and 
harshness, but only so much of it as was 
and had been generally recognized and 
enforced in this country, and as is and 
was suitable to our conditions." 
Id. at 127. 
In that case, the court held that the old English 
Common Law relating to married women, with "all its rigor and 
-6-
harshness11 which denied them legal existence was not suitable 
to our conditions and therefore had not been adopted. Id. at 
128-
That a husband1s consortium rights were part of the 
common law that was adopted is implicit in this court's 
statement in Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Ut.2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 
11972). The Ellis Court stated that a husband was placed on 
equal footing with his wife when his consortium rights were 
taken away in 1898. 493 P.2d at 986. At common law, a wife 
had no consortium rights and for a husband to be on equal 
footing with his wife by virtue of having his consortium rights 
taken away, the husband necessarily had consortium rights to 
take. 
Married Women's Acts similar to Utah's were passed 
throughout the nation to abolish the commonlaw fiction that the 
wife's legal identity was merged into that of the husband's. 
See 41 AmJur 2d Sec. 17. The husband's traditional common law 
right to recover for his injuries resulting from the loss of 
his wife's care, comfort and companionship was not seriously 
affected by the Married Women's Act. The Acts gave the wife a 
right to recover for her own injury and were only in conflict 
with the husband's right at common law to recover for his 
wife's injury in her place and stead. The Acts did not 
conflict with the husband's traditional consortium right to 
-7-
recover for his consequent injury resulting from injury to his 
wife, i.e., nis loss of her support, companionship and 
services. See Husbandfs Right to Damages For Loss of 
Consortium," infra. 
Despite this, in 1972, the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted Sec. 30-2-4 as eliminating a husband's right to 
damages for loss of consortium in Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 
at 986. In considering a wife's claim for loss of support, 
companionship, love and affection, the Court stated: 
MThe wife has no basis for her action. 
At common law she could not sue for loss 
of consortium, and under the Married 
Women's Act no cause of action was given 
zo ner for negligent injury to her 
husband. Our statute placed husband and 
wife on an equal basis by saying: 
...There shall be no right of recovery 
£y the husband on account of personal 
injury or wrong to his wife...'1 
Id. 
In Ellis v. Hathaway, the Court examined a wife's 
claim for loss of consortium, thus its statement that 30-2-4 
eliminated a husband's commonlaw right to recover for loss of 
consortium was mere dicta. Further, neither party in Ellis v. 
Hathaway briefed the consortium issue. Nonetheless, the case 
nas been followed subsequently and cited as establishing that 
Utah recognizes no cause of action in either spouse for loss of 
consortium. We submit that the case was incorrectly decided 
and should be reconsidered. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT TOTALLY 
ABOLISH A COMMON LAW RIGHT 
As discussed above, Utah adopted the common law which 
befitted our circumstances and conditions when it became a 
territory of the United States in 1850. The matter seems 
self-evident for Utah could no more have begun its body of law 
without reference to the common law, than a child could begin 
nis life without reference to his parents. What are the 
elements of a contract, the duties of a trustee, the criteria 
to determine agency? The American states refer to the English 
common law to establish these, not Finnish or Moorish. 
Among those common law rights was the right of a 
husband to sue for the loss of his wife's consortium. 
To read Sec. 30-2-4 as abolishing a husband's common 
law right to recover for loss of consortium would mean that the 
Utah State Legislature, three years after the State 
Constitution had been adopted, eliminated a cause of action 
which exisited at the time of the Constitution's adoption and 
replaced it with nothing. It should be noted that there is no 
express language in the Married Women's Act invalidating 
consortium claims. 
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Utah's Open Courts provision, Article I, Section 11, 
Utah Constitution, prohibits such an act of invalidation by the 
legislature. 
A. Courts in Other Jurisdictions Recognize 
,fRedress of Injury" or MOpen Court" 
Provisions as Limiting Legislative Power. 
Constitutional provisions are by their very nature 
intended to place restrictions on the exercise of governmental 
power. Recognizing that one of the purposes of a Constitution 
is to place limits on legislative power and that Injury Redress 
provisions such as that found in Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution are not to be interpreted as mere surplus 
language with no real effect, courts in numerous jurisdictions 
nave held sucn provisions as placing a limit on legislative 
power to abolish a common law right without providing an 
alternative. 
To be sure, Injury Redress provisions do not 
completely bar the legislature from enacting any laws that may 
affect some common law right. For example, statutes of 
limitation which do not completely cut off a right, as well as 
substantive changes which modify the right somewhat but still 
leave some kind of a remedy, are usually upheld. "The total 
denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a claim even 
-10-
oefore it arises, however, most certainly flies in the face of 
the constitutional command." Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering 
Company, Inc., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984). 
In Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 
(1932), the Kentucky Supreme Court used that state's 
constitutional Injury Redress provision to invalidate a guest 
statute. Concerning the consitutional provision in question, a 
provision which is almost identical to Utah's, the court stated 
chat: 
"It was the manifest purpose of the 
framers of that instrument to preserve 
and perpetuate the common-law right of a 
citizen injured by the negligent act of 
another to sue and recover damages for 
his injury.ff 
Id. at 351. 
The principle that a common law right could not be 
totally abolished without a substitute remedy being provided 
was reaffirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Taylor v. Hall, 
497 S.W.2d 218 (1973) . 
In Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 
3.W.2d 944 (1932), the Texas Supreme Court struck down a 
statute which made it virtually impossible to maintain a claim 
against a municipality for a street defect. 
Based upon that state's Injury Redress provision, the 
Texas Supreme Court has also struck down a medical malpractice 
statute which abolished the common law rule that the statue of 
limitations was tolled during the period of an injured party's 
minority. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2nd 661 (Tex, 1983). 
In the products liability field, numerous courts have 
held that statures of repose which prohibit a claim from being 
brought more than a certain number of years after the product 
was first manufactured or sold violate Injury Redress 
constitutional provisions. Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering 
Company, 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1974); Heath v. Sears Roebuck & 
Company, 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & 
Haggerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Ala,1982); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., 397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981). In these cases, the 
state supreme courts did not have to go so far as to hold that 
the legislature could never totally abolish a common law claim 
unless a substitute remedy was applied. Instead, they needed 
only to adopt a middle ground somewhere between a due process 
standard which requires only a minimal showing of statutory 
reasonableness, and the concept that the legislature could 
never under any circumstances abolish a common law right 
without providing an alternate remedy. In those cases, the 
legislation in question was closely scrutinized to see if in 
fact there was a real need for the statute and if the statute 
really accomplished that need without intruding on the common 
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law right any more than is necessary. The standard is best 
summarized in Overland Construction Company, Inc. v. Simmons, 
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) where that court interpreted the 
significance of its Injury Redress constitutional provision in 
these words: 
"Where a right of access to the courts 
for redress for a particular injury has 
oeen provided by statutory law predating 
the adoption of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Constitution of the State 
of Florida, or where such right has 
Decome a part of the common law of the 
state pursuant to Florida Statute 201, 
F.S.A., the Legislature is without power 
to abolish such a right without 
providing a reasonable alternative to 
protect the rights of the people of the 
state to redress for injuries, unless 
the Legislature can show an overpowering 
public necessity for the abolishment of 
such right, and no alternative method of 
meeting such public need can be shown.M 
id. at S73. 
Thus, it has been recognized that at the very minimum, 
common law litigation rights are substantive rights which are 
not to be easily legislated away. Where no alternative or 
meaningful remedy remains, the legislation will not be given 
the traditional deference to legislative power that is usually 
given, and it will be examined to see if it really does the job 
of eliminating a real social evil without unnecessary 
elimination of common law rights. 
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B. The Utah State Constitution, Article 
I, Section 11, Unquestionably Limits 
the Legislature's Ability to Totally 
Eliminate a Common Law Right. 
Both the structure of Utah's Constitution and 
statements by this Court demonstrate that Article I, Section 11 
places some meaningful limit on the legislature's ability to 
totally eliminate a common law right. Utah's Injury Redress 
provision appears in the Declaration of Rights section of our 
Constitution alongside the more widely-recognized fundamental 
rights which Americans have come to appreciate as being 
inherent and inalienable. It exists in addition to the 
traditional due process clause found in Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. It must, therefore, mean something more 
than being a meaningless embellishment of the due process 
clause if it is to be interpreted as being anything more than 
surplusage. To emphasize that the Constitutional provisions 
were not to be dismissed as meaningless statements of 
philosophy, Article I, Section 26 states: 
"The provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory unless by 
express words they are declared to be 
otherwise.ff 
In its decisions, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that Article I, Section 11 places some kind of a 
-14-
meaningful limitation on legislative power to abolish a common 
law right. In Brown v. Wightman, 47 Ut. 31, 151 P. 366 (1915) 
commenting on the plaintiff's contention that Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution changed the common law and 
added new rights, the Utah Supreme Court described its purpose 
in the following language: 
"The courts nave, however, always 
considered and treated these provisions 
not as creating new rights or as giving 
new remedies, where none otherwise are 
given, but as placing a limitation upon 
the legislature to prevent that branch 
of the state government from closing the 
doors of the courts against any person 
who has a legal right which is 
enforceable in accordance with some 
Known remedy." 
Id. at 366-367. 
In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Ut. 35, 151 P. 
558 (1915), the Utah Supreme Court again indicated its belief 
that Article 1, Section 11 placed some meaningful limit on the 
legislature's ability to totally abolish a common law right in 
these words: 
"Under our Constitution a right of 
action exists for any injury or damage 
to private property, and neither the 
Legislature nor the municipalities can 
interefere with that right .." 
Id. at 565. 
Statements in Karenius v. Merchants Protective 
Association, 65 Ut. 183, 235 P. 880, 884 (1925) and Horn v. 
Shaffer, 47 ut. 55, 151 P. 555, 558 (1915) also imply that 
constitutional problems would arise if the legislature 
attempted to totally abolish a common law right. 
In Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980), a case 
which involves an interpretation of the very statute upon which 
the court's prior consortium decisions were based, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed its earlier holding that a wife could 
not sue her husband for damages inflicted on her by him and 
neld that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not 
oar a wife's action for personal injuries intentionally 
inflicted by her husband. In reaching this decision, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution as one of the considerations which supported its 
conclusion that Section 30-2-4 does not bar a wife from 
maintaining such an action. 
C. To Allow An Interpretation of 
Section 30-2-4 As Eliminating 
the Right to Recover for Loss of 
Consortium Renders the Injury 
Redress Provision Meaningless. 
Unquestionably, Section JO-2-4 does take away a 
nusband's right to maintain an action to recover for his wife's 
injuries and gives that to the wife. The right to a remedy for 
injury to a wife is not taken away, but simply the standing to 
enforce the remedy is transferred from the man to the woman. 
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If this were all the statute was interpreted as doing, it would 
unquestionably be valid as the mere substituting of remedies is 
clearly permitted by any interpretation of an Injury Redress 
provision. 
Though the wife can sue for her injuries, the husband, 
under the interpretation advanced to date in Utah, cannot sue 
for his loss of consortium injuries even though they are 
recognized as separate and distinct from the injuries suffered 
by his wife and even though they were recognized at common 
iaw. In the necessary transfer of standing to enforce rights 
from nusband to wife, something has been lost without 
replacement. Properly analyzed, consortium claims do not 
result in double damages, and the failure to allow a consortium 
claim results in a net loss of legally recognized rights. 
Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. App.1950); 
Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960). 
Nor does the elimination of a husband's common law 
right to recover for loss of consortium serve any recognized 
public purpose. Again, the necessary equalization of rights 
which the Married Women's Acts were intended to bring about 
need not include an elimination of consortium rights. There 
were no legislative findings accompanying Utah's Married 
Women's Act indicating that consortium claims were to be 
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abolished. And if there were in tact some legislative intent 
to eliminate those rights, that intent was clearly an arbitrary 
one which would not suffice even under those decisions which 
permit elimination of common law rights under compelling 
circumstances• 
II. SECTION 30-2-4 OF THE MARRIED WOMENyS ACT, 
IS AMBIGUOUS AND HAS NOT BEEN INTERPRETED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECOGNIZED CANONS OF 
INTERPRETATION. THE STATUTE CAN BE READ 
AS REVOKING CONSORTIUM CLAIMS, OR AS BEING 
SILENT ON THE POINT. 
A. Construing Section 30-2-4 as 
Precluding Claims Causally 
Connected to a Spouse's Injuries Leads 
to Absurd and Obviously Unintended Results. 
Although Section 30-2-4 has been interpreted as 
eliminating a husband's consortium claims, it can more 
reasonably be construed as simply taking the wife's injury 
claim from the husband, giving it to the wife, and making it 
clear that the husband cannot maintain an action on behalf of 
the wife for the wife's injuries. 
In all the cases dealing with consortium in Utah, only 
one case, a Federal District Court decision in Black v. United 
States, 263 F.Supp. 470 (D.C. Utah 1967) has discussed the 
consortium issue in any detail. Significantly, in his 
discussion, Judge Christensen recognized that even though the 
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Utah statute is a little different from similar statutes in 
some other states, it still was not as clear on the consortium 
issue as those statutes found in jurisdictions where the right 
was clearly abolished by statute, and is still capable of being 
construed either way. Acknowledging this ambiguity, Judge 
Christensen stated that in an earlier case where Section 30-2-4 
was discussed, the case, and implicitly the statute also: 
''Really leaves unanswered whether in 
stripping the husband of any right of 
recovery for personal injuries sustained 
ny the wife arising out of the tort of 
the third person, the statute leaves him 
a right to recover for consequential 
damages or expenses sustained by himself 
arising out of the tort of a third 
person.ff 
263 F.Supp. at 476. 
Judge Christensen went on to decide the case not so 
much because of the wording of the statute which he 
recognized was ambiguous, but because of his hesitancy to 
plow what he perceived to be new ground in Utah law and 
because of his mistaken perception that allowing consortium 
claims might lead to double recovery, failing to recognize 
the existence of separate damages. Id. at 477-480. 
In a consortium action, the spouse claiming that 
loss is asserting a loss on account of his or her own 
injuries or damages. The words Hon account of personal 
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injury or wrong to his wife" were not intended to mean that a 
nusband can never recover when the damages he claims are 
proximately caused by injuries to his wife and those words 
have not barred a husband from recovering in a variety of 
other situations where the damages he claimed were "on 
account of personal injury or wrong to his wife". For 
example, if the wife died, does Section 30-2-4 prevent him 
from maintaining a wrongful death action? Obviously not. 
Yet those claims too are "on account of personal injury or 
wrong to his wife" in the sense that the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted those v/ords in Ellis v. Hathaway. 
Similarly, would a husband be precluded from 
maintaining an action for his emotional distress caused by 
his observation of traumatic injuries being inflicted on his 
wife? Again, no one would seriously assert that the wording 
of Section 30-2-4 should be used as a rationale for the 
denial of claims of that type which are now widely 
recognized. fet these claims are also "on account of 
personal injury or wrong to his wife" as that phrase has been 
interpreted in consortium decisions, and the loss of a wife's 
society, services, and companionship is just as real as any 
of those damages which can be traced to actually seeing the 
injury occur. 
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It is one of the fundamental rules of construction 
that statutes are not intended to produce absurd consequences. 
Where possible, statutes should be given a reasonable and 
sensible construction. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). The construction given by the court in 
Ellis v. Hathaway leads to such absurd consequences. 
B. If Possible, Statutes Should be 
Construed so as to Avoid 
Unconstitutionality. 
Another of the time-honored canons of statutory 
construction is that a statute will, if possible, be construed 
in a manner so as to give it effect and avoid its 
unconstitutionality. Monson v. Hall, 584 P.2d 833 (Utah 1978). 
As has been demonstrated, Section 30-2-4 construed as totally 
eliminating a consortium claim violates Article 1, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution even though it can reasonably be 
construed in a manner which would avoid that conflict by 
limiting it to its declared purpose — allowing the wife to sue 
for her own causes. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION REQURES THAT IF A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
EXISTS IN THE HUSBAND, ONE MUST ALSO 
EXIST IN THE WIFE. 
Recognition that Sec. 30-2-4 does not eliminate a 
cause of action for loss of consortium is dictated by adherence 
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to the Injury Redress provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Once a husband is recognized as having a cause of 
action for loss of consortium, the equal protection provisions 
of the Utah and United States Constitutions dictate that one be 
recognized in the wife also. 
Only two states, New Mexico and Wyoming, allow a 
husband to recover for loss of consortium while denying that 
right to a wife. The law's requirement of equal application 
and equal protection is therefore nearly universally recognized 
as applicable to this issue. 
A number of states have held specifically that 
allowing a husband a cause of action for loss of consortium 
while denying it to the wife violates equal protection 
provisions of state or federal constitutions. Schreiner v. 
Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 
(Fla. 1971); Deems v. Western Maryland R. Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 
A.2d 514 (1967); Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, Etc., 
246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile 
Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St.2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970); 
Hopkins v. Bianco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 855 (1974); Whitney v. 
Fisher, 417 A.2d 934 (Vt. 1980); Benjamin v. Cleburn Track £ 
Body Sales Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1294 (D.C.V.I. 1976); Lundgren v. 
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980). 
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In accord, Owen v. Illinois Baking Corporation, 260 
F.Supp. 820 (D.C. Mich. 1966); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 
207 N.E.2d 398 (1965); Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Company, 274 F.Supp. 169 (D. C. 111. 1967); Leffler v. Wiley, 
239 N.E.2d (Ohio 1968). 
IV. IT IS INCONSISTENT FOR WIDOW(ER)S TO 
BE ABLE TO RECOVER LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
DAMAGES WHILE THE SPUSE OF AN 
INCAPACITATED, THOUGH LIVING, MATE CANNOT. 
Article XVI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees the right to bring an action for wrongful death: 
The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death, shall never 
be abrogated, and the amount recoverable 
shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law. (As amended 
November 1920, effective January 1, 1921). 
In Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982), 
this court affirmed that damages in a wrongful death action 
include loss of society, love, companionship, protection and 
affection. These are the essential elements of consortium. 
The Ellis interpretation of Sec. 30-2-4 holds that 
spouses of mates who have been injured, but remain alive, may 
not recover for loss of consortium. Yet widow(er)s may recover 
for loss of consortium. The only difference is one of degree: 
the widow(er) has completely lost spousal consortium, whereas 
the spouse with the incapacitated mate has had it reduced. The 
difference in degree should only be reflected in damages 
awarded, not in a total denial of the right to bring the 
action. And in cases of severe incapacitation, the loss to the 
secondarily-injured spouse may oe greater than if the 
first-injured spouse had died, so even degree of loss is 
relative. 
The current interpretation of Section 30-2-4 in 
conjunction with Utah's allowance of loss of consortium damages 
in wrongful death actions creates an inconsistency in 
legislative policy which should not be countenanced. 
V. THE CONTINUALLY DEVELOPING COMMON LAW 
NOW OVERWHELMINGLY RECOGNIZES THAT 
JUSTICE DEMANDS RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM 
The common law is a vital growing body. Its nature 
allows it to respond to changing conditions and times. It is 
the responsibility of the courts to continuously maintain its 
upkeep• 
AS the California Supreme Court observed in Rodriguez 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 525 P.2d 669, 676 (Calif. 1974) 
wherein it recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium: 
"In California, as in other jurisdictions 
of Anglo-American heritage, the common law 
1
 is not a codification of exact or 
inflexible rules for human conduct, for the 
redress of injuries, or for protection 
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against wrongs, nut is rather the 
embodiment of broad and comprehensive 
unwritten principles, inspired by natural 
reason and an innate sense of justice, and 
adopted JDV common consent for the 
regulation and government of the affairs 
of men, 
'The inherent capacity of the common law 
for growth and change is its most 
significant feature• Its development has 
been determined by the social needs of the 
community which it serves• It is 
constantly expanding and developing in 
Keeping with advancing civilization and 
the new conditions and progress of 
society, and adapting itself to the 
gradual change of trade, commerce, arts, 
inventions, and the needs of the 
country•' (Fns. omitted.) (15 Am, 
Jur.2d, Common Law, Sections 1, 2, pp. 
794-796.) 
"In short, as the United States Supreme 
Court has aptly said, fthis flexiblity and 
capacity for growth and adaptation is the 
peculiar Doast and excellence of the 
common law.' (Hurtado v. California, 
(1884), 110 U.S. 516, 530, 4 S.Ct. Ill, 
118, 28 L.Ed. 232.) But that vitality 
can flourish only so long as the courts 
remain alert to their obligation and 
opportunity to change the common law when 
reason and equity demand it: 'The nature 
of the common law requires that each time 
a rule of law is applied, it be carefully 
scrutinized to make sure that the 
conditions and needs of the times have not 
so changed as to make further application 
of it the instrument of injustice. 
Whenever an old rule is found unsuited to 
present conditions or unsound, it should 
be set aside and a rule declared which is 
in harmony with those conditions and meets 
the demands of justice.' (Fns. omitted) 
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(15 Am.Jr.2d, Common Law, Sec. 2, p. 
797). In the common law system the 
primary instruments of this evolution 
are the courts, adjudicating on a 
regular oasis the rich variety of 
individual cases brought before them." 
The California Court went on to cite the Michigan 
Supreme Court's observation in Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 
Mich. 33, 101 NW2d 227, 229, (1960), wherein a cause of action 
was recognized in Michigan for loss of consortium, that: 
"'Were we to rule upon precedent alone, 
were stability the only reason for our 
being, we would have no trouble with 
this case. We would simply tell the 
woman to begone, and to take her 
shattered husband with her, that we need 
no longer be affronted by a sight so 
repulsive. In so doing we would have 
vast support from the dusty books. But 
dust the decision would remain in our 
mouths through the years ahead, a 
reproach to law and conscience alike. 
Our oath is to do justice, not to 
perpetuate error.' The court rejected 
the precedents denying recovery for loss 
of consortium as 'out of harmony with 
the conditions of modern society. They 
do violence to our convictions and our 
principles. We reject their 
applicability. The reasons for the old 
rule no longer obtaining, the rule falls 
with it. The obstacles to the wife's 
action were judge-destroyed.'" 
325 P.2d at 678. 
This Court likewise has recognized the common law's 
ability to respond to society's needs in Stoker v. Stoker, 
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616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980) wherein it recognized a wife's right to 
sue her husband• Therein it said: 
"The old common law fiction is not 
consonant with the realities of today. 
One of the strengths of the common law 
was its ability to change to meet 
changed conditions." 
Id. at 592. 
A. The Vast Majority of American 
Jurisdictions Now Recognize That 
Spouses Can Recover For Loss Of 
Consortium. 
Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin 
Islands and federal maritime law now allow both spouses a cause 
of action for loss of consortium. See Appendix, 
Of the four remaining states, New Mexico and Wyoming 
deny the wife's cause of action while allowing the husband's. 
Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 m. 211, 387 R2d 321 (1963) and 
Bates v. Donnafield, 481 R2d 347 (Wyo. 1971). 
And two states, Utah and Virginia, deny a cause of 
action to both spouses. Both states base the denial on 
judicial reading of a statute. However, Virginia's statute, 
Virginia Code, Section 55-36, states quite specifically that 
"no action for such injury, expenses or loss of services or 
consortium shall be maintained by the husband." 
The 2nd Restatement of Torts, adopted in 1976, 
reversed itself from the 1st Restatement of Torts and takes the 
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position that consortium claims should be allowed for both 
spouses. Sec. 693, 2nd Restatement of Torts. 
In the 3 5 years since the District of Columbia Court 
broke ground in this field by allowing a wife's cause of 
action, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra, there has been a nearly 
unanimous reversal in favor of allowing such claims. 
B. Recent Decisions of This Court 
Demons-crate That It is In Harmony 
With the Philosophy Underpinning 
the Allowance of Consortium Claims. 
This Court recently recognized in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), wherein it affirmed Utah's cause of 
action for alienation of affections, that ,fthe law protects 
many relational interests.,f Id. at 1215. The Court went on to 
list prospective economic relations, contractual relations, and 
the value of a plaintiff's interests in his or her 
relationships with family members among those. 
Ln Jones v. Carveil, supra, this court affirmed "loss 
of consortium" damages to a parent for the wrongful death of 
her 5-year-old son. In so affirming, this court stated: 
"recovery may be had for 'the loss of 
affection, counsel and advice, the loss 
of deceased's care and solicitude for 
the welfare of his or her family and the 
loss of the comfort and pleasure the 
family of deceased would have received 
... 
-28-
To assign a monetary value to loss of 
comfort, society, love, companionship, 
advice, and protection in some realistic 
manner, the trier of fact may consider 
factors relating to the physical, 
emotional, and psychological 
relationship, between the deceased and 
those entitled to recover, including the 
Kindly demeanor between members of a 
family. 
Concededly, such losses are difficult to 
quantify and impossible to fit into a 
mathematical formula which translates 
nhem in any precise fashion into 
monetary values. But the alternatives 
raise an even more serious problem. To 
say that the law recognizes no IOSS for 
intangible injuries resulting from a 
wrongful death is repugnant to basic 
numan values and flouts basic principles 
of justice.'1 
Id. at 108. 
And in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 
P,2d 1179 (Utah 1983), this Court expanded the elements of 
damages in a wrongful death action to include punitives where 
the actions against the deceased would have warranted punitive 
damages had the deceased lived. 
Clearly, recent decisions of this court demonstrate 
chat losses in a relational interest are compensable and, as 
such, consortium claims should be brought under that umbrella 
of recognition. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Cruz prays this court to reverse the trial 
court's dismissal of her claim and remand for determination of 
ner damages. She also prays for her costs. 
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While the rest of the nation has continued to 
recognize the legal protection which the common law gave to the 
marital relationship, and has expanded that protection to 
include the wife's right to be compensated when she experiences 
a loss of consortium, Utah remains unnecessarily isolated 
through cursory reliance on ambiguous language. This 
isolation remains in spite of constitutional protections which 
were designed to prevent common law rights from being totally 
lost. Further, the abrogation of the common law right need not 
nave occurred in Utah had recognized canons of interpretation 
been applied. 
Regardless of the standard by which it is judged, the 
court's Ellis v. Hathaway interpretation is not in accord with 
recognized constitutional law or recognized rules of 
interpretation. Regardless of whether the constitutional 
issues are reached, the interpretation on consortium set forth 
in Ellis v. Hathaway should be reversed. 
Relational interests are what life is about. The dry 
term encompasses love between men and women who care for each 
other so deeply that they have committed themselves to 
marriage. The genuine immediate relationship between a woman 
and her man, and a man and his woman, is not lightly to be 
disrupted by a tortfeaser who seriously injures one of them. 
Juries can weigh the disruption and whether the cause rests on 
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the tortfeasor. These are adequate safeguards, and with them 
in place, the marital relationship -- for better or for worse, 
in sickness or in health -- has the right to the protection of 
law from those, who through tort, compel the husband and wife 
to live in worse rather than better, in sickness rather than 
health. 
DATED May , 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I 
SAMUEL KING 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
£y due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
nimself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting 
m death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable 
shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in 
cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law. iAs amended November 1920, effective 
Janaury 1, 1921). 
Article XVI, Section 5, Utah Constitution. 
Statutes 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain 
an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own 
right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her rights and property as if 
unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery by the husband 
on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for 
expenses connected therewith, but the wife may recovery against 
a third person for such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and 
such recovery shall include expenses of medical treatment and 
other expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4 
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The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or 
in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or the Constitution or laws of this state, and so far 
only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and 
physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all of this state. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-1 
And be it further enacted, that the Constitution and laws of 
the United States are hereby extended over and declared to be 
in force in said Territory of Utah, so far as the same, or any 
provision thereof, may be applicable. 
Organic Act of the Territory of Utah, Section 17 
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JEFFREY 0. BURKHARDT 
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2120 South 1300 East 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS A. CRUZ and 
LORI L. CRUZ, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. , 
JED WRIGHT, 
I AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1 Civil No. 65389 
; 
COMES NOW the plaintiff Nicholas A. Cruz and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Utah County, Utah, 
and this cause of action arose in that county. 
2. At about 9:00 P.M., December 23, 1982, defendant was driv-
ing an automobile west and plaintiff was driving his automobile east 
on U, S. Highway 6, a two-lane road, between Elberta and Goshen, Utah. 
3. As the vehicles approached each other, defendant's vehicle 
crossed the center line of the road into plaintiff's line of travel. 
To avoid defendant, plaintiff swerved into the open lane, the lane 
defendant had been in, and defendant then swung back into his own 
lane, colliding with plaintiff. Defendant was driving at a high rate 
of speed. 
4. Sole proximate cause of the collision and plaintiff's re-
sulting injuries was defendant's negligence in failing to keep his 
vehicle under proper control, failing to yield right-of-way to plain-
tiff in plaintiff's lane of traffic, crossing the center line of the 
road, driving at a speed too fast for existing conditions, and speed 
regulations, failing to keep a proper look-out and such other negli-
gence as may be evidenced at trial. Plaintiff sustained injuries 
-1-
proximately and solely caused by the collision including broken bones 
which have and will permanently cause him pain, suffering, emotional 
distress, physical disability, medical expense, impairment of earn-
ing capacity, past and future wage and income losses, and other 
expenses including loss of defendant's self-employment, ownership 
and operation of a restaurant in Eureka, Utah. All of plaintiff's 
injuries and losses may be permanent. 
5. As a result of the collision, plaintiff sustained the loss 
of his automobile and the use thereof. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
COMES NOW plaintiff Lori L. Cruz, wife of plaintiff Nicholas 
A. Cruz, and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
6. Paragraphs 1 - 5 are herein incorporated by reference. 
7. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforemen-
tioned negligence of defendant, it is impossible for plaintiff 
Nicholas A. Cruz to perform his normal duties as a husband and to 
afford to plaintiff Lori Cruz the society afforded her before his 
injuries incurred in the collision, the injury done to plaintiff 
Nicholas Cruz has affected his disposition making it impossible for 
him to perform his family duties in the manner he was accustomed to 
prior to his injury, and such injuries to plaintiff Nicholas Cruz 
have deprived plaintiff Lori Cruz of the normal society and com-
panionship afforded her by him prior to the accident, and has caused 
her financial expense and caused her to work long hours for wages 
when she would have been with her family, all the foregoing having 
damaged plaintiff Lori Cruz in an amount to be determined at trial 
for special and general damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment against defendant finding 
defendant liable to plaintiffs, and for such sums of general and 
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special damages as are appropriate for each plaintiff, together 
with interest from the date of the accident, their costs and such 
other relief as may be appropriate. 
DATED June Jf , 1984. 
/ / 
z 
SAMUEL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to D. Gary-
Christian, 600 Commercial Club Bldg., Salt Lake City,UT 84111, 
U. S. mail, postage prepaid, June // , 1984. 
azel Sy^es 
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SAMUEL KING #1195 
JEFFREY 0. BURKHARDT #4002 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 So. 1300 East 
Salt Lake City,UT 84106 
486-3751 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS A. CRUZ, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JED WRIGHT, ] 
Defendant. 
1 JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
1 Civil No. 65389 
i Honorable Cullen Y. Christensei 
The complaint of Nicholas A. Cruz and of his wife, Lori Cruz, 
came on for trial before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge, 
sitting with a jury on December 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17, 1984. Plain-
tiffs were represented by their attorneys Samuel King and Jeffrey O. 
Burkhardt. Defendants were represented by their attorneys Gary 
Christian and Greg Sanders. The lost consortium claim of plaintiff 
Lori Cruz was denied by the court, after a proffer of proof, as a 
matter of law. At the close of the evidence concerning the com-
plaint of Nicholas A, Cruz, the case was submitted to the jury on 
a Special Verdict. The jury answered the Special Interrogatories as 
follows: 
1. Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant was negligent? 
ANSWER Yes 
2. If you answered question 1 "Yes," then answer this 
question: Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that such negligence on the part of defendant 
was a proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER Yes 
3. If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes," then answer 
this question: Did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his injuries, if any, were proximately 
caused by the accident in question? 
ANSWER Yes 
4. Did the defendant prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was negligent? 
ANSWER No 
5. If you answered question 4 "Yes," then answer this 
question: Did defendant prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that such negligence on the part of plaintiff 
was a proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER (Not Answered) 
6. If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes," but not both 
questions 3 and 4 "Yes," then you are to find defendant 
is 100% at fault in this accident. 
If you answered questions 4 and 5 "Yes," but did not 
answer "Yes" to both questions 1 and 2, then you are to 
find plaintiff is 100% at fault in the accident. 
If you answered questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 "Yes," then 
you have found both parties to be at fault, and you are 
to apportion their comparative degree of fault between 
them, the total figure to be 100 percent. 
Plaintiff's Fault (Not Answered) 
Defendant's Fault (Not Answered) 
TOTAL 100% 
7. If you have answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes," and 
have not found plaintiff having fault equal to or greater 
than defendant, then answer this question: What amount of 
money, if any, did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence he is entitled to recover from defendant? 
Medical Expenses to date $27,190.34 
Loss of Earnings to date 44,952.00 
General Damages 70, 642.00 
TOTAL $142,784.34 
Is] Donald Figgatt 
FOREPERSON 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the jury's answers to 
the special interrogatories as set forth above, the court enters 
judgment in behalf of plaintiff, Nicholas A, Cruz, against defen-
dant, Jed Wright, in the sum of $142,784.34, together with interest 
on the special damages, pursuant to §78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, 
at 8% per annum from the date of the occurrence of the collision 
between the parties, December 23, 1982, through December 22, 1984, 
which special damages total $72,142.34, and the interest totals 
$11,542.77, for a total judgment in favor of Nicholas A. Cruz 
against Jed Wright in the sum of $154,327.11. The complaint of 
Lori Cruz against Jed Wright is denied and dismissed. Plaintiff 
Nicholas A. Cruz is awarded costs of court incurred herein. 
DATED Mztrf ^ / 19%jT~7 
BY THE COURT: 
CULLEN Y^CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Hand carried a copy of the foregoing to Gary Christian, 
attorney for defendant, December 20, 1984. 
Samuel Kfng 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND AMOUNT: 
GARY CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN. P.C. 
ATTORNEYS FOR D e f e n d a n t 
SOO COMMERCIAL CLUB BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 34111 
(SOI) 521-3773 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS A, CRUZ and 
LORI L. CRUZ, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JED WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 65389 
Judge: Cullen Y. Christensen 
COMES NOW the plaintiff'in the above-entitled action by and 
through his attorney, Samuel King, and acknowledges satisfaction 
in full of the Judgment rendered in this case based upon plain-, 
tifff S*Complaint. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 1985. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
'tilvn 
SAMUEL KING Pr 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Personally appeared before me Samuel King this 11th day of 
-1-
January, 1985, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
within instrument. 
4/W(,4>AJ 7 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Cake County, 
Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to Greg Sanders, attorney for the respondent, 
600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, May 20, 1985. 
Y 0. BURKHARDT 
